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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine being a parent to a child you could not see because you were 
incarcerated in prison.1  As you serve a prison sentence, your little girl is 
bouncing from one home to another without permanency until she finally 
ages out of the foster care system.2  Despite a lack of permanency, your 
child continues to maintain a close connection with you.3  Throughout 
eight time-consuming years, comes a story of change and perseverance 
for a parent and his little girl.4  Unfortunately, this is a story many 
individuals in the same situation would not experience.5  In most 
 
1. See Vivek Sankaran, Termination of Parental Rights: What’s The Rush?, IMPRINT  
(Sept. 20, 2018, 6:11 AM), https://imprintnews.org/opinion/termination-of-parental-rights-whats-
the-rush/32250 [https://perma.cc/DCX9-W95U] (illustrating an attorney’s account of a client’s 
successful rise as a parent after problematic choices led to a proceeding attempting to terminate his 
parental rights). 
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jurisdictions, this story of perseverance would not have occurred as most 
courts would have terminated this father’s parental rights.6   
In this story, the father sold drugs, failed to care for his little girl, and 
was serving time in a jail cell while his daughter was growing up.7  For 
many, this seems clear cut; there appears to be a good cause and case to 
terminate the father’s parental rights.8  However, this father did not have 
his parental rights terminated.9  Instead, the father finished serving his 
time, continued to maintain the relationship with his daughter, helped 
finance her education, and, today, proudly and tearfully watches her walk 
the stage as she receives her J.D.10  A joyous moment captivated by a 
long, enduring road this father may have been unable to experience if in 
a different jurisdiction.11  This father’s resilience is precisely what the 
termination of parental rights undermines and prevents when a parent’s 
right to maintain a relationship with their child is legally terminated 
expeditiously.12 
The implications of termination proceedings carry massive 
repercussions that forever alter the life and connection between a parent 
and child.13  Once a parent’s rights have been terminated, it is deemed 
final, irrevocable, and, for almost all other purposes than inheritance, 
 
6. See id. (noting the expeditious correlation between our judicial proceedings and the 
termination of parental termination); cf. In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶¶ 20, 436 P.3d 206,  
at 221 (“[I]f there is a practical way to keep parents involved in their children’s lives that is not 
contrary to the children’s best interests, a court should seriously consider such an option.”). 
7. Sankaran, supra note 1 (showing how courts do not tend to preserve the parent-child 
relationship when they see evidence that a parent is unfit). 
8. Id. 
9. See id. (emphasizing a seemingly “unfit” parent can still turn things around and preserve 
his parental rights and maintain a good relationship with his child). 
10. Id. (recognizing the importance of preserving the legal rights of a parental relationship 
while incarcerated); Juris Doctor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Doctor of law—
the law degree most commonly conferred by an American law school. . . . Also termed Doctor of 
Jurisprudence; Doctor of Law; law degree.”). 
11. Sankaran, supra note 1 (describing the importance of advocating for the termination of 
parental rights only in extreme cases). 
12. See id. (explaining the need to construct a statutory scheme that only terminates parental 
rights if absolutely essential). 
13. See Stephanie N. Gwillim, Comment, The Death Penalty of Civil Cases: The Need for 
Individualized Assessment & Judicial Education When Terminating Parental Rights of Mentally Ill 
Individuals, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 341, 344 (2009) (“Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) 
is the death penalty of civil cases.  Once a parent’s rights to his or her child are terminated, that 
parent’s right to care for, visit, or make decisions for the child are gone forever . . . [and t]he child 
can immediately be put up for adoption and a biological parent may never see their child again.”). 
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severs the parent-child relationship completely.14  With no legal right to 
a continued relationship with the child, the adoption process can begin 
and end with a parent never seeing their child again.15  Thus, the decision 
to terminate a parent’s rights must meet what due process demands, the 
production of a sufficient measure of evidence to support the permanent 
severance of rights.16  However, diligence in meeting the exacting 
standard of evidence in due process is not always given by some courts.17   
Following the inception of the 1997 Adoption and Legal Guardianship 
Incentive Payments Program,18 there has been a governmental push to 
incentivize states who finalize more adoptions of children in the foster 
care system.19  As a result, Texas has seen a steady influx of annual 
adoptions that totaled 5,703 in 2016, roughly 3,455 more than the number 
of annual adoptions in Texas during 2002.20  That begs the question, has 
the incentive-based program affected the way parental terminations are 
handled?21  As it turns out, the incentive-based program may have a 
plausible connection to the approach Texas uses in its parental 
termination proceedings.22  After all, the adoption process cannot take 
 
 
14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206; In re R.H., No. 04-98-00051-CV, 1998 WL 904355, 
at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 30, 1998, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Gwillim, 
supra note 13, at 344. 
15. Gwillim, supra note 13, at 344.  See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.001(b) 
(describing the qualifying requirements for a child to be considered for adoption in Texas). 
16. See In re J.E.M.M., 532 S.W.3d 874, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no 
pet.) (emphasizing how Texas requires clear and convincing evidence to sever the parental 
relationship). 
17. See, e.g., In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 864, 870 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) 
(expressing disapproval over the trial court’s improper use of judicial notice to admit evidence that 
was otherwise inadmissible). 
18. Adoption, CHILD.’S BUREAU: AN OFF. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAM., 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/focus-areas/adoption [https://perma.cc/Y4WQ-YAEM] (last updated 
Oct. 1, 2020). 
19. Christie Renick, Bigger in Texas: Number of Adoptions, and Parents Who Lose Their 
Rights, IMPRINT (May 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://imprintnews.org/featured/bigger-in-texas-
adoptions-and-parents-who-lose-their-rights/30990 [https://perma.cc/SF2J-V5QB] (showing how 
a federal initiative rewarding states who finalize adoptions has led to short fuses in some states, 
such as Texas, and to an ever-increasing amount of parental terminations). 
20. Id. 
21. See generally id. (discussing the increase of Texas adoptions and parental terminations 
could be linked to the incentive-based program). 
22.  See David Crary, Terminating Parental Rights: State Policies Vary Widely, AP NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2016), https://apnews.com/c9fec9ee24d64f4b9e56d1425179a50e [https://perma.cc/SN 
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place before the rights of a parent are permanently severed.23   
Today, a problem directly affected by the Adoption and Legal 
Guardianship Incentive Payments Program involves the disproportionate 
amount of parents in Texas who are losing their rights on a basis 
providing little to no evidence under one of the highest evidentiary 
standards: clear and convincing evidence.24  A basis some courts in 
Bexar County25 have trouble understanding.26  This comment will 
address the effects of the Adoption and Legal Guardianship Incentive 
Program on parental terminations, the use of evidence in Texas Courts 
when terminating parental rights, and the proper utilization of “clear and 
convincing evidence.”27  
In Part II, this comment will address the foundational viewpoints and 
the historical background of parental rights in the Constitution, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.28  Part III will 
describe the process of parental termination in Texas and examine the 
complex approaches of other states when terminating the parent-child 
relationships.29  Part IV will address the effects of the Adoption and 
Legal Guardianship Incentive Payments Program (ALGIP) in Texas.30  
Next, Part V will identify and address the improper use of evidence in 
 
3U-BFUU] (“Critics of the Texas [family law] system say it is sometimes too quick to conclude 
that adoption is the best outcome for a child, and doesn’t give biological parents an adequate chance 
to address problems so their child could stay with them.”). 
23. Renick, supra note 19.  
24. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the 
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or 
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’’); see also Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (“[D]ue process requires that the State support its allegations [in 
a parental termination proceeding] by at least clear and convincing evidence.”). 
25.  A county within the vicinity of the San Antonio, Texas area.  
26. See In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 149 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019) (Chapa, J., 
dissenting) (relying on facts not in evidence violates the role of judicial notice by impairing the 
truth-seeking function of the court and denying parents of their due process rights); see also In re 
G.M., No. 04-19-0080-CV, WL 3432088, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019) (Martinez, 
J., dissenting) (admonishing the trial court for allowing evidence not admitted at trial to support the 
court’s parental termination order). 
27. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 747–48. 
28. See infra Part II. 
29. See infra Part III. 
30. See infra Part IV.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2018) (identifying criteria an 
incentive eligible state must be in compliance with and describing the incentive-based funds an 
incentive eligible state can receive). 
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Texas courtrooms with an emphasis on Bexar County.31  Finally, Part VI 
will suggest recommendations to properly terminate parental rights in 
Bexar County.32   
I.    THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 
A. Parents and Their Constitutional Rights 
1. Philosophical Views and the Foundational Eras of Parental Rights 
Early theoretical viewpoints on parental rights can find their origins in 
philosophy.33  Throughout the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, 
philosophers John Locke and William Blackstone each shared an 
innovative common belief about the parent-child relationship.34  Both 
philosophers believed a parent did not necessarily have rights in regard 
to parenthood, but rather occupied a set of responsibilities meant to 
ensure the safe upbringing and well-being of the child.35  These 
responsibilities were deemed to be finite in duration and would conclude 
when the child became of age, meaning the parents were obligated to 
ensure the child’s development until they reached the age of twenty-
one.36 
Furthermore, if a parent failed to uphold their responsibilities, there 
was a strong belief that the state would stand ready to enforce the rights 
of the child.37  Therefore, it was the philosophical viewpoint the natural 
rights of a parent would be subjected and subordinate to the power of 
 
31. See infra Part V. 
32. See infra Part VI; see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (explaining how a 
parent’s constitutional interest during a termination proceeding requires due process to justify the 
termination of a parent-child relationship). 
33. JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND 
THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 20 (Yale Univ. Press 2014) (comparing philosopher’s 
theories on the “rights enabl[ing] social beings to carry out their social duties.”). 
34. Id. at 23. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 21 (“Parents . . . are duty-bound to bring children to the state of reason that is 
every child’s birthright. . . .  [They have an obligation] to take care of their [o]ff-spring, during the 
imperfect state of [c]hildhood.”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE & THOMAS COOLEY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 453 (Chicago, Callaghan and Co., Detroit Free Press 
3d rev. ed. 1884) (“[P]ower of a father [over his child] . . . ceases at the age of twenty-one.”). 
37. SHULMAN, supra note 33, at 23 (“[T]he state stands ready to enforce these rights if the 
parent fails to do his duty.”). 
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states.38  As a result, the philosophical mindset was not that parents had 
an absolute right or power to their child, but rather a conditional 
privilege.39  However, this philosophical view was not always the 
prevalent mindset.40 
In the colonial era,41 children were seen as economic producers in the 
labor-hungry colonies.42  Thus, a child in this era did not have rights and 
instead was a commodity on the open market subject to the control of 
their father, who could at any time decide it was time to part with his 
child.43  Similarly to property, children were under the possession and 
control of their father.44  Unlike the philosophical perspective coined by 
John Locke, a mother in the colonial era did not have an equal share in 
authority or power over her child.45   
The colonial era followed common law and held on to the belief a 
father had a natural right to the child the mother did not possess.46  
Despite having a significant role in the child’s infancy, mothers faced the 
harsh reality knowing they were not equal to fathers under the law.47  
Compared to fathers, mothers had very few enforceable rights and 
responsibilities to a child.48  Fathers, on the other hand, were responsible 
 
38. See id. (explaining the state laws act as a fail-safe enforcement mechanism). 
39. Id. 
40. See DR. KATHLEEN K. REARDON & CHRISTOPHER T. NOBLET, CHILDHOOD DENIED: 
ENDING THE NIGHTMARE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 85 (2008) (noting the mindset in the 
colonial period thought the father, or head of the household, had “complete rights” to his children 
and their labor). 
41. Colonial Period 1607–1776, SCHOLASTIC, https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/ 
articles/teaching-content/colonial-period-16071776/ [https://perma.cc/9AEN-HHDP]. 
42. REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 40, at 85. 
43. Id. 
44. See SHULMAN, supra note 33, at 42 (“The state could not take from the father his right 
of parental control, any more than it could deprive him of more tangible property rights.”). 
45. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: AND A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION 122 (Yale Univ. Press 2003); see  BLACKSTONE & COOLEY, supra note 36,  
at 452–53 (“[A] mother . . . is entitled to no power [over her child], but only to reverence and 
respect . . . .”); see also SHULMAN, supra note 33, at 20 (describing how the Lockean theory 
consisted of the parent having a privilege or duty to ensure that their kids have a freedom of thinking 
and development that prepares the child with “mental, moral, and physical capability to meet any 
situation.”  Locke “repudiated the absolute power of the domestic patriarch” other theorist during 
that time period believed should be a father’s “right of dominion.”). 
46. REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 40, at 85 (“[T]he father had a natural right to his 
children and the mother ‘was entitled to no power . . . .”). 
47. Id. at 86. 
48. Id. 
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for producing a productive member of the community.49  In some 
colonies, the failure to produce a productive member of the community 
could result in town officials removing and placing a child into an 
involuntary apprenticeship with another master.50  Apprenticeships 
could also be voluntary, whereby the child’s father entered into an 
arrangement with another party to train the child in a specific trade in 
exchange for the child’s labor.51   
During the nineteenth century, legal and social statuses started 
changing by emphasizing the interests of children as individuals with 
rights.52  This transitional period contained many inconsistencies and 
breakthroughs in the area of custodial law.53  During this period, courts 
within the same state battled contradiction and could not decide whether 
to uphold the primacy of father’s rights or to hold onto a new-founded 
belief the mother better served the interests of the child as the natural 
guardian.54  This transitional period resulted in the recognized 
importance of a mother’s parental rights and gave rise to a new era in the 
history of parental rights—the tender years doctrine.55   
Family law transcended from a father’s near-absolute right to a child 
into a movement applying the best interest standard while simultaneously 
using the tendered years doctrine to determine who would serve in the 
child’s best interest and gain custody of the child.56  Highlighted by 
 
49. Mary Ann Mason, Masters and Servants: The American Colonial Model of Child 
Custody and Control, 2 INT’L J. CHILD RTS. 317, 320 (1994).   
50. Id. at 321 (“In New England . . . if, following the town officials’ warning the 
child . . . was found ‘rude, stubborn and unruly,’ the town officials had the right to remove the 
children from the parents and ‘place them with some masters for years . . . [while] forcing them to 
submit unto government . . . .”).   
51. Id. at 324. 
52. See REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 40, at 96 (addressing society’s attempt to shift 
away from fathers having absolute control over the child). 
53. Id. at 87.  
54. Id. (reiterating the inconsistencies between courts in the same state). 
55. Understanding the Tender Years Presumption in Custody Cases, MEN’S RTS., 
https://mensrights.com/tender-years-presumption/ [https://perma.cc/LF99-AVAB] (“[T]he tender 
years presumption, often referred to as the tender years doctrine, originated in the United States in 
1881 . . . .”); see  Latham v. Latham, 71 Va. 307, 333 (1878) (“When the child . . .  is of very tender 
years, and the mother is deemed a suitable person, the custody is given to her, as essential to the 
health and life of the infant . . . .”). 
56. Ana M. Novoa, Count the Brown Faces: Where is the Family in the Family Law of Child 
Protective Services, 1 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 5, 14–15 (1999) 
(describing the shift of custody cases from the mid-nineteenth to twentieth century). 
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societal perception, the tender years doctrine stood for the presumption 
mothers were better equipped in meeting the needs of a young child and 
thus were the preferred parent for a child to reside with after the resolution 
of a custodial dispute57  The notion of the tender years doctrine 
represented a new found power and change in history underscoring the 
reformation of the mother’s parental right to her child.58  It stood as a 
right altering the landscape of the playing field in custodial law by 
favoring mothers as natural guardians of the child until the doctrine met 
its demise in the mid-twentieth century.59  Following the departure of the 
tender years doctrine, courts were left with the vague best interest 
standard to resolve cases involving custodial rights.60   
2. The Supreme Court of the United States and its Interpretation of the 
Twentieth Century Evolution of Parental Rights  
At the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of the United 
States found itself within the boundaries of revolutionizing family law.61  
More specifically, the Supreme Court, through a series of cases, made 
defining decisions on one of the most critical aspects of family law: 
parental rights.62  These decisions established clear, binding precedent 
 
57. See generally Understanding the Tender Years Presumption in Custody Cases, supra 
note 55 (analyzing the evolution of the meaning and impact of the tender years doctrine on child 
custody cases). 
58. See id. (implying the tender years doctrine gave power to the mother and gave her more 
rights); see also Lee v. Lee, 2000-CA-00872-SCT (¶ 17) (Miss. 2001) (describing the early 
development of the tender year doctrine favored women when it came to custodial disputes of a 
child unless the mother was deemed unfit). 
59. See REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 40, at 100 (noting how state legislatures and courts 
systematically erased the tender years doctrine); see also Understanding the Tender Years 
Presumption in Custody Cases, supra note 55 (describing the demise of the tender years 
presumption as a result of violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
60. REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 40, at 100; see Seibert v. Seibert, 584 N.E.2d 41,  
42-43 (1990) (recognizing other courts use of the “relevant” factors to determine a child’s best 
interest). 
61. The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights Doctrine, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG, 
https://parentalrights.org/understand_the_issue/supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/G4JU-Y2H3] 
(summarizing the defining Supreme Court cases that heightened parental rights and the rugged 
steps that followed and led to a lack of clear precedent). 
62. Id.; see Linda Elrod, The Federalization of Family Law, A.B.A. (July 1, 2009), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rig
hts_vol36_2009/summer2009/the_federalization_of_family_law/ [https://perma.cc/TU5Y-CL 
UM] (discussing how family law protections became constitutional and how it evolved over the 
twentieth century through Supreme Court decisions).  
9
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courts followed without confusion until the beginning of the twenty-first 
century when the Supreme Court decided Troxel v. Granville.63  The 
Supreme Court, prior to Troxel,64 continuously protected parental rights 
in a long line of cases by giving parental rights the highest respect and 
protection possible.65 
Starting with Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court began a century-
long endeavor to protect parental rights from state intervention.66  In 
Meyer, the Court dealt with a state statute prohibiting the teaching of 
foreign languages to students who had not passed eighth grade.67  The 
Court invalidated the statute by holding the statute was arbitrary and 
unreasonably exceeding the proper exercise of the state’s police power 
by infringing on fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.68  The Court’s decision made it clear a parent, as an 
individual, has certain fundamental rights under the liberty guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.69  These fundamental rights include 
establishing a home and the ability to direct the religious upbringing and 
education of their children.70   
 
63. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights Doctrine, 
supra note 61.  
64. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 58 (referring to the history of parental 
rights prior to this case). 
65. See generally Christopher J. Klicka, Decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
Upholding Parental Rights as “Fundamental”, HOME SCH. LEGAL DEF. ASS’N (Oct. 27, 2003), 
[https://perma.cc/9EKL-DKXM] (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Race and 
Social Justice) (“The Supreme Court of the United states has traditionally and continuously upheld 
the principle that parents have a fundamental right . . . [and] has unwaveringly given parental rights 
the highest respect and protection possible.”). 
66.  See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (acknowledging the state 
does not have the power to prohibit schools from teaching any other languages to children besides 
English because “[c]orresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give 
his children education suitable to their station in life.”). 
67.  Id. at 396–97. 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399–402. 
69. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 401 (establishing individuals have certain 
fundamental rights that must be respected).  See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 401–03 (interpreting the 
right to teach children a foreign language and direct their education is a fundamental right of a 
parent); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (explaining how legislation 
cannot interfere with the liberty of a parent to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control). 
10
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These rights were furthered in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters when the 
Supreme Court asserted it was a parent’s fundamental right to keep their 
child free from government standardization.71  The Court struck down a 
state law requiring all children to attend public schools by making it clear 
a “child is not the mere creature of the state . . . [it is only those] who 
nurture him and direct his destiny [who] have the right and high duty 
to . . . prepare additional obligations [on the child].”72  As a result, 
parents received a Constitutional liberty interest guaranteeing their right 
to engage teachers regarding their child’s instruction and the power to 
control the child’s education over the preferences of the state.73  
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court noted parental rights 
were not limitless and could be restrained through the states as “parens 
patriae.”74  There, the Court upheld a state law regulating child labor 
because the state, as parens patriae, could restrict a parent’s control by 
prohibiting or regulating child labor to prevent psychological or physical 
injury.75  Highlighted by the state’s police powers, the Court held the 
state encompassed a wide range of powers to limit parental freedom when 
dealing with a child’s welfare.76  However, the Court’s stance was not 
without regard for the high protection and respect of parental rights in the 
private realm of family life.77 




71. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The fundamental theory of 
liberty . . .  excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children . . . .”); Klicka, supra 
note 65 (stating it is the parent’s right to direct the upbringing and education of their children). 
72. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399–400 (holding parents have an interest in their children’s upbringing).  
See generally Klicka, supra note 65 (providing an outline of parent’s fundamental rights). 
73.  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 535; Klicka, supra note 65. 
74. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“Acting to guard the general interest 
in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school 
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor,  and in many other ways.”); see Parens 
Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[T]he State in its capacity as provider of 
protection to those unable to care for themselves.”). 
75. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 166–67 (“[T]he state has a wide range of power for 
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare . . . .”). 
76. Id. at 166–67. 
77. Id. at 166 (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder.”). 
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cases involving parental rights reached the Supreme Court.78  With the 
Due Process Clause standing in the way of state intervention, the 
evolution of parental rights revolved around the notion the state could not 
sever the ties of a family or its parental rights unless the state proved: (1) 
there was parental consent; or (2) a showing of unfitness and a finding it 
would be in the child’s best interest.79  However, the Supreme Court did 
not stop there.80 
Instead, in Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court elevated the belief 
of unfitness.81  The Court, realizing the severity and impact of a parental 
termination case, recognized there was a fundamental liberty interest at 
stake and reversed the lower court’s decision for using an improper 
standard of proof.82  The Court, in landmark language, held the 
fundamental rights of a parent could not “evaporate” simply because 
parents failed to act as model parents or temporarily lost custody of their 
child.83  Rather, to sever such a relationship, unfitness had to be proved 
by clear and convincing evidence.84  A burden of proof the lower courts 
in this case erroneously failed to use by applying the preponderance of 
 
78. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“[T]his case involves the 
fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the state, to guide the religious future and 
education of their children.  The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition 
of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.  This primary role of the parents 
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American 
tradition.”); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 
(1977) (“[L]iberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be 
sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights, as they have been understood in ‘this Nation’s 
history and tradition.’”). 
79. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (noting a state’s forceful breakup of 
a family without a showing of unfitness would offend the Due Process Clause); see also Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303–04 (1993) (explaining “the best interest of a child” standard is not the 
absolute or exclusive criterion for the government when making custodial decisions; the best 
interest must be reconciled with many other concerns). 
80. See Klicka, supra note 65 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of parental 
rights over the twentieth and twenty-first century); see also The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights 
Doctrine, supra note 61 (explaining the parental right evolution captivated the twentieth century). 
81. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing parental rights do not 
terminate simply because they were not a model parent or have temporarily lost custody to the 
state). 
82. Id. at 769–70 (holding the standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is the proper 
standard of review in parental termination cases). 
83. Id. at 753. 
84. Id. at 769 (“[Holding a clear and convincing standard] adequately conveys to the 
factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due 
process.”). 
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evidence standard.85  Anything less than a clear and convincing standard 
would violate the parent’s liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.86   
The Supreme Court went a step further in Washington v. Glucksberg 
and held freedoms protected under the Due Process Clause as liberty 
interests—including the right to direct the education and upbringing of a 
parent’s children—could not be infringed unless the state could prove the 
infringement was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.87  
Despite the century-long advancement of parental rights, the twentieth 
century would end on a much different note than the beginning of the 
twenty-first century.88 
3. Current Legal Doctrine 
The twentieth century came with consistent rulings by the Supreme 
Court concerning the parental rights doctrine.89  However, the start of the 
twenty-first century was anything but consistent.90  The Court brought a 
halt to this consistency when they decided Troxel.91  Despite the clearly 
established precedent, the Court found itself with a plurality opinion of 
 
85. Id. at 747–48 (striking the New York law which requires only “fair preponderance of 
the evidence” to support a parental termination claim); see also Preponderance of the Evidence, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“[S]uperior evidentiary weight that, though not 
sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and 
impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”). 
86. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 768–69 (“[Use of the] fair preponderance of the 
evidence’ standard in a parental termination case . . . violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and ‘a clear and convincing evidence’ standard of proof strikes a fair 
balance between the rights of the natural parents and the state’s legitimate concerns.”). 
87.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).   
88. See generally The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights Doctrine, supra note 61 
(commenting on the how the Supreme Court decided to forgo upholding clearly established 
precedent in favor of an unclear line of reasoning that has left a “confusing legacy” for practitioners 
in family law). 
89. See id. (discussing the consistent culmination of Supreme Court rulings heightening 
parental right protections). 
90. E.g., id. (describing the disastrous aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in Troxel 
and how individual judges and states could now apply their own rules to parental rights). 
91.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (sparking a debate and 
split amongst six justices about the Constitutionality of state statutes implicating a parent’s rights 
to control visitation with third parties).  See generally The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights 
Doctrine, supra note 61 (describing the differences between parental right cases before and after 
Troxel). 
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five separate conflicting concurring and dissenting opinions.92  
Generating a total of six opinions from the nine justices and a country full 
of dazed family law practitioners.93   
This case centered on a grandparent’s right to visitation and carefully 
underlined the state’s involvement in the parent-child relationship.94  
However, the viewpoints expressed by the justices in separate opinions 
gave way to confusion.95  The confusion in Troxel introduced a new era 
where clarity was obscured by the varying standards courts interpreted 
the case to stand for.96  In Troxel, the Court faced a decision regarding a 
Washington state law permitting any person to petition a state court for 
visitation rights to a child at any time as long as it was found by the court 
to serve the best interest of a child.97 
There, the paternal grandparents sought visitation rights to their 
grandchildren after their son’s untimely death left the children’s mother 
with full control over visitation.98  Although the mother allowed the 
grandparents to see the children regularly, she soon limited visitation to 
“one short visit per month.”99  The conflicted Court, through a plurality 
opinion, affirmed the judgment of the state Supreme Court in favor of the 
mother holding: (1) the state statute swept too broadly and (2) 
unconstitutionally interfered with a parent’s fundamental rights.100   
The plurality opinion emphasized the growing demographic changes 
in American society as the average American family composition 
 
92. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 57; John Dewitt Gregory, The Detritus of Troxel, 40 
FAM. L. Q. 133, 143 (2006). 




94.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (O’Connor, J., plurality). 
95. See Alessia Bell, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the Constitutional 
Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 227 (2001) (providing examples of 
the various reactions to the justices’ myriad opinions). 
96. See Sandra Martinez, The Misinterpretation of Troxel v. Granville: Construing the New 
Standard for Third-Party Visitation, 36 FAM L. Q. 487, 495 (2002) (exploring how the lack of 
clarity resulted in courts applying varying standards). 
97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 60 (deciding whether parental rights outweighed 
visitation rights of third parties). 
98. Id. at 60. 
99. Id. at 61. 
100. Id. at 72–73 (O’Connor, J., plurality). 
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transitioned to include more single-parent households.101  Doing so 
allowed the Court to evaluate parental rights in a modern setting by 
considering individuals outside of the immediate family who frequently 
assisted in child-rearing.102  This allowed the Court to ignore precedent 
established three years prior in Washington v. Glucksberg, where the 
Court held the infringement of parental rights required a strict scrutiny 
analysis.103 
As a result, the Court affirmed and continued their protection of 
fundamental parental rights at the expense of foregoing recent precedent 
that strengthened those same rights in favor of a balancing approach 
considering the best interest of a child and fitness of a parent.104  The 
plurality not only went against clear precedent, but it also caused more 
confusion in the dynamics of family law by refusing to consider the 
precise scope of parental due process in the context of non-parental 
visitation.105  The Troxel decision held onto traditionally protected rights 
but concluded by leaving out a strict scrutiny requirement in favor of the 
vague best interest standard.106   
This case not only caused confusion with law once considered 
consistent, but it also showed there were other views by justices who 
disagreed with the plurality.107  One such view came from Justice 
Thomas, who urged the appropriate standard of review when dealing with 
fundamental constitutional rights required strict scrutiny.108  Another 
view, exhibited by Justice Stevens, stood for the belief: (1) there was no 
 
101. Id. at 63–64 (O’Connor, J., plurality). 
102. Id. at 64 (explaining the importance of protecting the bonds between individuals 
beyond the immediate family who frequently assist with child rearing). 
103. See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (affirming the 
Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights such as child rearing and must be subject to the 
highest scrutiny). 
104. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 70–72 (O’Connor, J., plurality). 
105. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 73 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (explaining the 
standard for awarding visitation rights to individuals outside the immediate family are specific to 
each case and therefore cannot be determined with an all-encompassing ruling). 
106. Id. at 73–74 (O’Connor, J., plurality).  See generally The Supreme Court’s Parental 
Rights Doctrine, supra note 61 (detailing the confusion caused by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Troxel). 
107. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 57 (emphasizing the six concurring and 
dissenting opinions expressed by the justices in the visitation context of parental due process). 
108. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stressing the importance of applying strict scrutiny 
to infringements of fundamental rights of parents, such as the right to raise their children and make 
decisions about their education and socialization). 
15
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need to review Troxel;109 and (2) for a perspective favoring state 
autonomy when dealing with the Due Process Clause.110  The common 
theme of Troxel established there is no longer a clear precedent, much 
less a clear opinion by the Supreme Court on the appropriate basis of 
review on such issues.111  Instead, what has followed reveals states are 
inconsistent in their standard of review when dealing with proceedings 
attempting to infringe on the parent-child relationship.112  Approaches 
used have varied and will likely continue to do so in the absence of a 
present-day Supreme Court case assessing the appropriate scrutiny.113  
II.    APPROACHES TO THE TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD 
RELATIONSHIP 
A. The Texas Approach to the Termination of Parental Rights 
In Texas, the process of terminating parental rights begins with the 
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (Department).114  
 
109. See id. at 84–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that the Due Process 
Clause provides enough protection for state courts to individually review cases and decide the Due 
Process issues presented to them without unnecessary interference from a higher court). 
110. Id. at 80, 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing there was no need to reexamine the 
issues presented in Troxel and by doing so the Court has failed to recognize trial judges usually 
take the wishes of the parent into account and place a great deal of weight on their choices). 
111. Cf. The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights Doctrine, supra note 61 (detailing the 
fundamental difference of parental rights cases handled prior to Troxel decision and the confusion 
left on courts after the decision). 
112. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (providing the involuntary termination of the 
parent-child relationship is sufficient under the clear and convincing standard of evidence if it is in 
the best interest of the child and a parent meets one of the factors listed in the statute).  But see 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507 (West 2012) (reiterating the termination of parental rights may be 
allowed only if found by the court to be strictly necessary); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-
601 (West 2010) (recognizing the infringement of parental rights cannot occur unless strict scrutiny 
is met); see also In re CC, 102 P.3d 890, 894 (Wyo. 2004) (“[A]pplication of statutes for termination 
of parental rights is a matter for strict scrutiny.”).  See generally The Supreme Court’s Parental 
Rights Doctrine, supra note 61 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s split decision in Troxel . . . opened the 
door for individual judges and states to apply their own rules to parental rights.”). 
113. See Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 S.M.U. L. REV. 127, 128–30 
(2018) (commenting on the confusion left in the wake of Troxel and emphasizing the lack of a 
Supreme Court holding that clearly defines the appropriate scrutiny has led to uncertainty within 
the lower courts across the United States). 
114. See generally Child Protective Investigations, TEX. DEP’T. OF FAM. & PROTECTIVE 
SERV.’S, https://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Investigations/default.asp [https://perma.cc/RUL5-EUNM] 
(indicating the steps and responsibilities taken by the Department throughout an investigation 
which can lead to the termination of rights). 
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One of the ways the Department gets involved is by investigating whether 
a child’s safety is at risk after receiving a report about possible abuse or 
neglect.115  If the investigator determines a child faces a significant 
safety risk, the Department may seek a temporary order removing the 
child from the possession of the parents.116  Additionally, the 
investigator could possibly end the parent’s rights through the initiation 
of a Suit Affecting Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR).117  
The Department’s removal of a child can be done in one of two 
ways.118  The first approach requires the Department file a temporary 
order requesting court permission to take possession of a child if, “there 
is an imminent danger to the health and safety of the child; the child’s 
continued living in a home” with his parents or guardians “would 
endanger the child’s welfare; and for situations where there would be no 
time to obtain” an “adversary hearing.”119  Under the second approach, 
if “there is no time to obtain a temporary order,” the Department may 
remove the child if they have “personal knowledge of facts” or 
“information furnished by another” indicative of imminent danger to the 
“health and safety of the child.”120   
If the Department comes into possession of a child without receiving a 
court order, the court must hold a hearing on or before the first working 
day after removal to determine who the child will remain with.121  
Further, the Department must also file a SAPCR and request the child be 
appointed an attorney ad litem (AAL).122  However, assuming the 
Department received a court order or was determined in the previous 
hearing to maintain possession of the child after removal, then a full 
 
115. See generally id. (outlining the responsibilities of the Department and the process used 
to handle reports of neglect, abuse, and human trafficking). 
116. See generally id. (stating the requirements necessary to use a temporary order to protect 
a child from an unsafe household). 
117. See generally id. (indicating an investigator responsibilities include making a finding 
on whether a child is safe or unsafe and describing the discretionary alternative actions the 
investigator may take when a child is deemed unsafe). 
118. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.102(a)(1)–(3); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104(a). 
119. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.102(a)(1)–(3). 
120. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.104(a)(1)–(2). 
121. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.106(a)–(c) (explaining if the hearing is not done 
within the prescribed limits of the statute, the child will be returned to the parents). 
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.105(a)(1)–(2); see Attorney Ad Litem, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Attorney ad litem is a court appointed lawyer who represents a child 
during the course of a legal action, such . . .  as a [parental] termination [proceeding].”). 
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adversary hearing must be done no later than fourteen days after the child 
was removed.123   
Additionally, the court must not commence the hearing without 
informing parents who are unrepresented by counsel of their right to 
representation and, if indigent, their right to court-appointed counsel.124  
In this adversarial hearing, unless an extension is granted, the court must 
decide whether the Department will maintain conservatorship, where the 
placement of the child will be, assess the rights of parents involved, and 
examine the risk of danger to a child.125   
Following a court’s order of conservatorship, there must be a status 
hearing within sixty days to review the status of the child and service 
plan.126  After the status hearing, a permanency hearing is held within 
six months after the order granting the Department conservatorship to 
review the permanency plan, the status of the child, and to ensure a final 
order will be rendered before the required dismissal of the suit.127  A 
series of subsequent permanency hearings may be held prior to a final 
order if it is no later than four months after the initial or subsequent 
permanency hearings.128  In the subsequent permanency hearings, the 
same tasks employed by the court in the initial permanency hearing are 
utilized to evaluate the progress of the parties involved in the case.129  
 
123.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(a) (requiring an advisory hearing be done in a 
timely manner). 
124. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(c)(1)–(2) (mandating specifically worded 
disclosure must be given to parents about their rights to an attorney). 
125. See generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.201(g) (outlining conditions in which a 
child might continue to be in the possession of the Department after an adversarial hearing). 
126. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.201(a). 
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.304(a); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(a) 
(“Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or granted an extension . . . on the first 
Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the 
department as temporary managing conservator, the court’s jurisdiction over the [SAPCR] . . . that 
requests termination of the parent-child relationship or requests that the department be named 
conservator of the child is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court 
order.”). 
128. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.305 (clarifying time frames for permanency hearings 
must take place before a final order can be rendered). 
129.  See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.306(4) (discussing duties and tasks the court must 
perform in each permanency hearing including: (1) identify[ing] all persons and parties present at 
the hearing; (2) reviewing the efforts of the department; . . .  (4) review[ing] the extent of the 
parties’ compliance with temporary orders and the service plan and the extent to which progress 
has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the cause necessitating the placement of the child 
in foster care; . . . .”).  See generally TEX. YOUNG LAW.’S ASS’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW 
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If a year has passed since the Department was granted temporary 
managing conservatorship, the court must enter a “final order”130 or 
dismiss the case on the first Monday after the year anniversary, unless 
there is a finding of “extraordinary circumstances.”131  If the court 
determines there were extraordinary circumstances, the SAPCR may be 
retained for no more than six months after the finding was made.132  
Finally, suppose the final order ends in a mistrial, a new trial, or is 
remanded by an appellate court.133  In that case, the court must schedule 
a new trial date no longer than six months the final order’s initial 
conclusion or automatically terminate the suit if a new trial has not 
commenced.134 
Once a court enters a trial on the merits, it may only enter a final order 
terminating the rights of a parent if it meets the two-pronged analysis 
outlined in the Texas Family Code.135  To properly terminate a parent’s 
rights, the Department must first prove its burden by clear and convincing 
evidence that at least one of the grounds listed in the statute has been 
 
ABOUT YOUR CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR CPS CASE 15–17, http://26i1x33zddmb2ub5ei1n3bec-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CPSTimelineDFPSHandbookFINAL1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5BKX-MFZW] (elaborating on the step-by-step process of hearings and removals 
from inception to end). 
130. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401 revisor’s note (“a final order is an order that:  
(1) requires that a child be returned to the child’s parent; (2) names a relative of the child or another 
person as the child’s managing conservator; (3) without terminating the parent child relationship, 
appoints the Department as the managing conservator of the child; or (4) terminates the parent child 
relationship and appoints a relative of the child, another suitable person, or the Department as 
managing conservator of the child.”); see also  TEX. YOUNG LAW.’S ASS’N, supra note 129, at 17, 
http://26i1x33zddmb2ub5ei1n3bec-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CPSTi 
melineDFPSHandbookFINAL1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BKX-MFZW] (outlining what the protocol 
is for continuing/dismissing a case after one year); cf. In re C.T., 491 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex. 2016) 
(expounding on the necessity of the final order after one year of removal to ensure stability for the 
child removed). 
131. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b); see also In re C.T., 491 S.W.3d at 329 
(explaining how case law has not developed or described circumstances qualifying as extraordinary 
circumstances). 
132. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b). 
133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b-1). 
134. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b-1) (detailing procedures to be followed if the 
commencement of a final order ends in a new trial, mistrial, or is remanded by an appellate court 
for further action). 
135.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)–(2). 
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met.136  Secondly, the Department must show it is in the best interest of 
the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.137  Courts often 
employ the non-exhaustive Holley138 factors to ascertain the best interest 
of the child.139  According to Holley, some of the factors courts consider 
include, “the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody . . . and 
any acts or omissions of the parent,” 140 which can often include acts and 
omissions of disadvantaged parents such as those in an immigrant 
family.141   
Since a parent’s right to their kids involves fundamental constitutional 
rights, proceedings seeking the termination of a parent’s rights must be 
strictly scrutinized and construed in favor of the parent.142  Thus, an 
action seeking to disrupt the parent-child relationship is untenable 
without solid and substantial justifications.143  In Texas, there is a 
rebuttable presumption the best interest of a child is served by 
 
136. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) (listing the statutory basis utilized 
by the Department for terminating parental rights); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 161.001(b)(1)(K) (recognizing a parent’s right to voluntarily terminate their parental rights). 
137. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 
(“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of the court in determining 
the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.”). 
138. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976). 
139. See, e.g., In re G.M., No. 04-19-0080-CV, WL 3432088, at *5 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio July 31, 2019, no pet.) (applying and analyzing non-exhaustive Holley factors to 
analyze the best interest of the child). 
140. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (“[Holley factors include: (1)] the desires of the 
child; [(2)] the present and future emotional and physical needs of the child; [(3)] the present and 
future emotional and physical danger to the child; [(4)] the parental abilities of the individuals 
seeking custody; [(5)] the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest 
of the child; [(6)] the plans held by the individuals seeking custody of the child; [(7)] the stability 
of the home of the parent and the individuals seeking custody; [(8)] the acts or omissions of the 
parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and [(9)] 
any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.”); see also TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. 
§ 263.307(b)(12)–(13) (listing other relevant statutory factors to determine the best interest of the 
child, such as “whether the child’s family demonstrates adequate parenting skills.”). 
141. See Catrina Guerrero, Comment, Divided States of America: Why the Right to Counsel 
is Imperative for Migrant Children in Removal Proceedings, 22 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. 
ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 29, 85–86 (2020) (discussing how indigent parent’s rights are stripped 
without adequate representation in a termination case for their migrant child). 
142. See generally Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985) (“[T]ermination 
proceedings should be strictly scrutinized, and involuntary termination statutes are strictly 
construed in favor of the parent.”). 
143. In re G. M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 84647 (Tex. 1980). 
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maintaining the parent-child relationship.144  Even with this strong 
presumption in favor of preserving the parent-child relationship, Texas 
recognizes the “prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe 
environment” is in the best interest of the child.145  A presumption 
accompanied by the logic of providing children with permanence but 
otherwise incognizant of the permanent disruptive dangers posed to 
families by an incentive-based federal system rewarding states for 
expeditiously terminating the parent-child relationship.146 
B. The Approaches of Other States to the Termination of Parental 
Rights 
Although Texas has uniformly prescribed the termination of the 
parent-child relationship through a statutory approach similar to the 
Court’s viewpoints in Troxel,147 other states carry distinct variations in 
their legislative code and court opinions.148  Some states have gone 
above and beyond in their interpretation of Troxel149 by adding language 
strengthening the basis of parental rights.150  Regardless, the consensus 
is there will be variation among states until the Supreme Court decides to 
clear up the inconsistencies in Troxel151 by clarifying the law.152  Until 
 
144. Id. at 847 (“[T]he courts of this State have often employed more than a preponderance 
of the evidence to rebut the strong presumption that the best interest of a child is usually served by 
maintaining the parent-child relationship.”). 
145. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). 
146.  See Kim Phagan-Hansel, One Million Adoptions Later: Adoption and Safe Families 




0or%20adoptive%20parents [https://perma.cc/4D47-GYTK] (noting the evolution of a federal 
incentive-based system’s push for permanency and its disruptive effects on parental rights). 
147. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
148. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (explaining the two-prong analysis courts 
must follow to involuntarily terminate the parent-child relationship); see also Protecting Parental 
Rights at the State Level, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG, https://parentalrights.org/states/ [https://perma.cc 
/YB2H-8VNF] (highlighting the varying state laws in the “parental rights” context). 
149. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 57. 
150. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507 (West 2020) (requiring courts to find the 
termination of parental rights “strictly necessary” before doing so); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1-601 (2010) (demanding the state to meet strict scrutiny before infringing on parental rights). 
151. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 57. 
152. Ryznar, supra note 113, at 130 (“A uniform or predictable level of scrutiny in parental 
right cases will not appear without being addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. . . . [S]electing a 
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then, Family law practitioners must be comfortable with being 
uncomfortable when dealing with the inconsistencies in the law of 
parental rights.153  Notable differences regarding parental termination 
include state legislation and caselaw from Utah and Arizona.154 
1. Utah’s “Strictly Necessary” and Arizona’s Strict Scrutiny 
Utah has differentiated itself from other states by introducing the words 
“strictly necessary” in its statute governing parental termination 
proceedings.155  Its implementation attempts to strengthen parental 
rights after an extensive amount of caselaw diluted the meaning of the 
two-part analysis defined by the state legislature.156  Similarly to other 
states, Utah’s two-part analysis requires a finding: (1) of a statutory 
ground favoring termination; and (2) that termination would serve the 
best interest of the child.157  However, unlike many states, the addition 
of the “strictly necessary” language is used as an integral part of the best 
interest inquiry and has been interpreted by the Utah Appellate court to 
authorize the severance of parental rights “only when it is absolutely 
essential to the child’s best interest.”158  The vague nature of such words 
illustrates the perplexing approaches some states are taking to strengthen 
the fundamental rights of parents since the Troxel opinion unclearly set 
parameters in the parental right context.159 
 
level of scrutiny grows more complicated as courts encounter a wider range of parental right cases 
and as states regulate more on issues implicating parents.  Given that one role of the Supreme Court 
is to clarify the law, the Court should not get accustomed to leaving the levels of scrutiny in family 
law cases unclear.”). 
153. See id. (concluding the Troxel decision led to inconsistencies and unpredictability in 
the application of the law). 
154. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507 (West 2020) (broadening the requirements 
for terminating parental right by requiring courts to find the termination is “strictly necessary”), 
with Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 446 P.3d 380, 388 (Ariz. 2019) (Bolick, J., dissenting) 
(citing the legislative intent of the state to enforce strict scrutiny while admonishing the majority’s 
oppressive ruling and its blatant disregard for said legislative intent). 
155. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507(1) (West 2020). 
156. See In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶¶ 20–32, 436 P.3d 206, at 213–16 (demonstrating 
how Utah case law has shifted the burden of proof in parental termination cases to parents and has 
consistently been in contrast to statutory commands, including the new statutory language 
strengthening the rights of parents). 
157. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507(1) (West 2020). 
158. In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶¶ 44–51, 436 P.3d 206, at 219–20. 
159. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000) (choosing not to define the precise 
scope of the parental due process right and indicating that the standard varies from case to case 
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Notwithstanding the vagueness attributed to the “strictly necessary” 
language, the legislature and courts of Utah are using the application of 
such language to disavow a line of Utah cases setting unfavorable 
precedent for parental rights.160  The disavowed “almost automatically” 
line of cases in Utah courts unfairly concluded if a statutory ground for 
termination was found, it “almost automatically” followed that 
termination was in the best interest of the child.161  Such an inference 
veers away from recognized fundamental parental rights.162  It’s an 
inference Utah is attempting to remedy in order to protect and strengthen 
parental rights from the ill-advised methods its courts have utilized in the 
past to sever the parent-child  relationship.163  This statutory scheme 
demonstrates how state courts often move too quickly to sever the parent-
child relationship when, in reality, it should only be severed in the most 
“extreme cases.”164  
Arizona, on the other hand, is akin to other states who utilize a form of 
strict scrutiny consistent with the pre-Troxel era.165  Although Arizona 
approaches parental rights in a similar context as other states, its 
similarity should not be misguided.166  While many states endorse the 
fundamental protections of parental rights, few have taken statutory steps 
 
based on the facts); cf. The Supreme Court’s Parental Rights Doctrine, supra note 61 (illustrating 
the lengths that States take to strengthen fundamental parental rights after Troxel). 
160. See In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 61, 436 P.3d 206, at 222 (concluding a line of 
cases in Utah made ill-advised holdings that were and continue to be in tension with the 
constitutional rights of parents). 
161. Id. at 219 (emphasizing how the “best interest” element should be applied 
independently and wholly separate from the statutory grounds analysis).   
162. Id. at 222. 
163. Id. (providing guidance on the dichotomy of the two-part test for termination of 
parental rights).   
164. See id. at 211 (“[T]he termination of parental rights is a drastic measure that should be 
resorted to only in extreme cases, when it is clear that the home is unable or unwilling to correct 
the evils that exist.”); see also Vivek Sankaran, Termination of Parental Rights: What’s The Rush?, 
IMPRINT (Sept. 20, 2018, 6:11 AM), https://imprintnews.org/opinion/termination-of-parental-
rights-whats-the-rush/32250 [https://perma.cc/DCX9-W95U] (acknowledging Utah’s statutory 
scheme and its prioritization on preservation of important relationships). 
165. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-601 (2010).  See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57 (2000) (creating an inconsistent standard of review with regards to a parent’s fundamental 
rights); see generally Protecting Parental Rights at the State Level, supra note 148 (indicating 
which states protect parental rights through strict scrutiny). 
166. See Protecting Parental Rights at the State Level, supra note 148 (clarifying Arizona’s 
intricacies within its state laws). 
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to protect those rights with the express usage of strict scrutiny.167  
Arizona’s statute, enacted roughly a decade after the Troxel decision, 
demonstrates the legislature’s intent to protect parental rights with the 
highest level of scrutiny.168   
Consistent with the views raised by Justice Thomas’ concurring 
opinion in Troxel, Arizona’s judiciary is the only piece of the puzzle 
lagging behind in the state.169  Since the enactment, Arizona courts have 
seldom utilized strict scrutiny as a part of their analysis.170  The 
judiciary’s blatant disregard for the statutory protections resulted in 
Arizona courts’ ruling the statute inapplicable to the case at hand and 
therefore absent from the analysis or as part of a dissenting opinion in the 
state’s highest court.171  While the statute aspires to strengthen parental 
rights, the perplexing nature of Troxel continues to create sharp divides 
within the Supreme Court and throughout branches of state 
governments.172  
III.    THE ADOPTION AND LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP INCENTIVE PAYMENTS 
PROGRAM AND ITS EFFECTS ON PARENTAL TERMINATIONS IN TEXAS 
A. Origination  
Throughout the 1990s, a drastic surge of children entered into foster 
 
167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-601 (2010); see Protecting Parental Rights at the State 
Level, supra note 148 (emphasizing how some states still do not protect parental rights through 
strict scrutiny). 
168. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-601 (2010) (requiring the elements of strict scrutiny be 
applied when evaluating parental rights).  See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 80 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding the plurality recognized a parent’s fundamental right but 
failed to articulate an appropriate standard of review). 
169. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating the 
appropriate standard of review should be strict scrutiny); see also Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child 
Safety, 446 P.3d 380, 388 (Ariz. 2019) (Bolick, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s decision offends another 
essential of due process, the right to know how to comply with the law.”). 
170. See, e.g., Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 446 P.3d at 388 (Bolick, J., dissenting) 
(critiquing the lower court’s termination of parental rights process for straying far from 
constitutional requirements). 
171. Id. at 395 (Bolick, J., dissenting). 
172. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-601 (2010) (explaining parental rights cannot  
be infringed without meeting strict scrutiny), with Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 446 P.3d  
at 388–89 (Bolick, J., dissenting) (noting current termination procedures “do not provide adequate 
due process protections”).  See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (noting how the majority did not articulate an appropriate standard of review).   
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care due to a growing drug-use epidemic.173  As the influx of children in 
foster care increased, child welfare programs were often left ill-equipped 
to preserve the parent-child relationship and, as a result, faced 
heartbreaking choices.174  In 1997, Congress responded with the 
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), a bipartisan bill implemented 
to speed up a foster child’s path to permanency.175  To achieve this goal, 
the ASFA utilized controversial enactments which included the 15/22 
rule176 and a federal incentivizing program awarding monetary funds to 
states who annually increased their baseline number of children 
adopted.177   
Over time, the incentive program was reauthorized, revised, and 
transformed into the Adoption and Legal Guardianship Incentive 
Payments Program (ALGIP).178  Under a revised framework, the ALGIP 
awarded incentives based on four-designated baselines: (1) foster child 
adoptions; (2) foster child legal guardianships; (3) pre-adolescent foster 
child adoptions and legal guardianships for children between the ages of 
nine through thirteen; and (4) older child adoptions and legal 
guardianships for children fourteen and older.179  With awards ranging 
from $4,000–$10,000, states only needed to surpass the previous fiscal 
year’s number of adoptions in a designated baseline to bring in monetary 
funds.180  A total of forty-three million dollars were authorized to be 
appropriated for the 2015 and 2016 fiscal years, giving states like Texas 
 
173. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146.  
174.  See id. (explaining states were “desperately” slow to find children homes which led 
children to remain in foster care for years). 
175. Id. 
176. See Olivia Golden & Jennifer Macomber, The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 
INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 8–34, 
https://affcny.org/wp-content/uploads/IntentionsandResults.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JD3-VGGU] 
(illustrating how the 15/22 rule required states to terminate parental rights if a child has been in 
foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months). 
177. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146. 
178. See generally Memorandum from United States Department of Health and Human 
Services: Administration of Children, Youth and Families to the State, Territorial and Tribal 
Agencies Administering or Supervising the Administration of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act 
1–2 (July 8, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/pi1508.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD 
3J-L4T3] (summarizing the federal program’s history and transformation throughout the 1990s to 
2010s). 
179. Id. at 2.  
180. Id. at 2–6 (detailing the requirements to gain monetary compensation through each 
baseline category of the ALGIP). 
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the ability to capitalize on such funds by prioritizing terminations to reach 
the end goal: leaving more children available for adoption while 
improving their capability to receive monetary awards for such 
efforts.181  
While forty-three million dollars may not be the billion-dollar 
incentive states dream of, it certainly is enough to fatally and implicitly 
promote the severance of familial ties for states aiming to capitalize on 
Congress’s attempt to speed up the adoption process.182  Although these 
funds served a methodical purpose at its inception, it is essential to realize 
these incentives could always be construed to serve a purpose suitable for 
today’s world.183  A purpose prompted towards incentivizing states for 
keeping families intact instead of tearing them apart.184 
B. Criticism, Effects, and Statistics 
The ALGIP is not without its fair share of critics.185  The ALGIP has 
been critiqued by many for leaving numerous children as orphans because 
they aged out of system that failed to find a successful adoption 
placement.186  Although the ALGIP has declined the amount of time 
 
181. See generally DeLeith D. Gossett, The Client: How States Are Profiting from the 
Child’s Right to Protection, 48 MEM. L. REV. 820 (2018) (describing how financial incentives 
prioritizing adoption have disrupted families and led to the speedy termination of parental rights). 
182. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146. 
183. See Susan Notkin et al., Intentions and Results: A Look Back at the Adoption  
and Safe Families Act 130–36, https://affcny.org/wp-content/uploads/IntentionsandResults.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2JD3-VGGU] (“[I]t is important to affirm that families should be provided with 
appropriate and timely services to help them resolve issues that led to their involvement with the 
child protection system.  As many of the families involved with the child welfare system are low 
income, significant investment in services to support these families must occur, and systems must 
have the flexibility to tailor these services to support the unique needs of individual families.”);  
see also Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146 (addressing the idea more resources should have been put 
behind keeping families together). 
184. See Notkin, supra note 183, at 134 (“The current adoption incentive program should 
be expanded to reward states’ efforts to reunite children with their families and place them 
permanently with relatives . . . .”); see also Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146 (condemning the 
federal program for promoting incentives for terminating parental rights instead of  allocating more 
resources to keeping families together). 
185. E.g., Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146 (noting how critics have asserted the program has 
failed to decrease the youth aging out of or being emancipated from foster care). 
186. Id.; David Crary, Terminating Parental Rights: State Policies Vary Widely, AP NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2016), https://apnews.com/c9fec9ee24d64f4b9e56d1425179a50e [https://perma.cc/SN 
3U-BFUU] (discussing how federal and state policies favor terminating parental rights and leave 
orphans without a family and without anything gained as they age out of a foster care system). 
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needed for adoptions to be completed and increased the number of 
finalized adoptions per year, these increases remain outpaced by the 
number of kids slated for such outcomes.187  While adoptions have 
increased by fourteen percent since 2012, reaching nearly 60,000 in 2017, 
the amount of children waiting to be adopted throughout the same time 
frame has increased by approximately twenty-three percent.188  As a 
result, over 120,000 children are left waiting for their chance at 
permanency.189 
While federal data suggests the states are lowering the number of 
parental right terminations occurring in their jurisdiction, some states, 
including Texas, are bucking the trend by implementing more parental 
terminations.190  As a result, states bucking the trend are terminating 
parental rights at rates twenty-five times higher than states at the lower 
end of the scale.191  Further, for the first time since the program’s 
implementation, less than fifty percent of children originally separated 
from their parents are reunited.192  These repercussions have left more 
children in foster care as their parents face the legal system head-on with 
the possibility of termination inching closer to fruition.193   
Critics of the Texas family law system believe there is a “culture of 
bias against the biological parent.”194  A bias leaving some to believe 
Texas is too quick to conclude adoption is the best outcome for a child 
while leaving biological parents without a chance to address their 
situation equitably.195  Since the ALGIP was established in 1997, states 
have received a total of 713 million dollars in funding from incentives 
 
187. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Crary, supra note 186.  
191. See id. (highlighting the inconsistency between federal data showing a decrease in 
parental rights terminations and other federal data show some states drastically increasing parental 
rights terminations). 
192. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146.  
193. See Crary, supra note 186 (explaining the hardships and negative bias parents face in 
the legal system after their children are taken away which creates a presumption that their rights 
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offered.196  Of the fifty states, thirty-four have received less than ten 
million dollars throughout the program’s entire history.197   
Unsurprisingly, Texas is not one of those thirty-four states.198  Texas 
is at the forefront “consistently” reaping the rewards of the federal 
incentive program.199  As of 2019, Texas has hauled in nighty-four 
million dollars, encompassing over thirteen percent of the funding handed 
out.200  Historically, Texas leads all states in incentive-earning history 
with a whopping thirty-two million dollars of separation between the 
second-highest incentive earning state, California.201   
Since 2006, Texas has proceeded to terminate the parental rights of 
over 90,000 children.202  Besides California, no other state has been able 
to exceed 43,000 parental terminations in the same time frame.203  While 
the number of terminations can always be attributed to the sheer 
population size of Texas, it does not coincide with the fact Texas 
consistently surpasses the previous fiscal year’s designated baseline of 
adoptions to bring in federal monetized incentives.204  With fiscal years 
ending in earnings upwards of twelve million dollars, Texas has been 
coined the king of adoptions.205  A title earned because of the 
 
 
196. John Sciamanna, HHS Releases FY 2019 Adoption/Guardianship Incentives for States, 
CWLA https://www.cwla.org/hhs-releases-fy-2019-adoption-guardianship-incentives-for-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZ3R-A39Q]. 
197. Christie Renick, Bigger in Texas: Number of Adoptions, and Parents Who Lost Their 
Rights, IMPRINT (May 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://imprintnews.org/featured/bigger-in-texas-
adoptions-and-parents-who-lose-their-rights/30990 [https://perma.cc/SF2J-V5QB]. 
198. See id. (addressing how Texas received eight times the amount of money in incentives 
as of 2015 alone compared to the thirty-four states who had received less than ten million dollars 
over eighteen years). 
199. Id. (examining how Texas is repeatedly at the top of the list of states receiving 
incentives from the ALGIP despite the program’s decision to make revisions to its calculations over 
the last two decades). 
200. Sciamanna, supra note 196. 
201. Id. 
202. Renick, supra note 197.  
203. See id. (identifying California terminating parental rights for 79,218 children since 
2006, only second to Texas in that time frame). 
204. Id.; see Sciamanna, supra note 196 (noting the amount of federal incentives earned by 
States per fiscal year in the Adoption and Legal Incentive Payment Program). 
205. See Renick, supra note 197.  See generally Sciamanna, supra note 196 (providing 
statistics showing Texas has accumulated the most amount of federal incentives from the ALGIP 
since it was established in the late 1990s). 
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overwhelming amount of terminations occurring in the state.206   
In striking contrast, many states fail to draw awards from the incentive 
program.207  As many as twenty-seven to thirty-two states have failed to 
yield an adoption incentive award in different fiscal years.208  Even 
states, such as California, who have been able to draw out some of the 
largest awards, have not seen consistent results.209  Unlike all other 
states, Texas is in a league of its own and has consistently capitalized on 
the incentive-based program since it was first implemented.210   
Critics attribute the way Texas handles its process of parental 
terminations as a basis for their consistent success in the ALGIP 
program.211  With a practice of initiating terminations upon the removal 
of a child, critics claim Texas has caused the “de facto goal” to be 
termination.212  Advocates believe this practice is an underlying policy 
to serve the state’s convenient purposes rather than the child’s best 
interest.213  A standard standing directly against the intent to serve a 
child’s best interest.214   
Texas’s ratio of parental right terminations is exceedingly high.215  For 
every 1,000 children in foster homes, 296 have had their parent’s rights 
terminated.216  In contrast to California, where 26,000 more children are 
in foster care, Texas’s ratio of children who parents had their rights 
terminated is more than double the size of California’s ratio.217  With 
 
206. See Renick, supra note 197 (stating Texas has terminated the highest number of 
parental rights than any other state since 2006). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. (comparing the number of States that have failed to receive an adoption award over 
different years). 
209. Id. 
210. See id. (“For Texas . . . the incentives have become a modest, but predictable, stream 
of revenue year after year. . . . The state’s incentive has topped $1 million in all but five of the last 
18 years . . . .”). 
211. Id. (illustrating how the correlation between children being put for adoption and the 
steps Texas takes to terminate parental rights leads to a consistent source of incentives earned from 
the ALGIP). 
212. Id. 
213. See id. (explaining how the manner and mode that Texas terminates parental rights 
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such a high ratio and number of terminations occurring in Texas, it begs 
the question: where do the millions of dollars received go to?218   
While thirty percent of the incentives are federally mandated to be 
spent on post-adoption services; the rest is placed in Child Protective 
Services (CPS) purchased services, substance abuse purchased service, 
and CPS direct delivery staffing.219  Both CPS purchased services and 
CPS direct delivery staff expenses are considered to be non-adoption 
related expenses.220  Surprisingly, the bulk of the incentives are spent on 
the CPS direct delivery staff.221  Activities associated with the CPS 
direct delivery staff include salaries for caseworkers who help children in 
the process of permanency.222   
However, are these incentives aligned in the most efficient manner?223  
With an abundant amount of terminations occurring every year, is Texas 
implicitly affecting the way courts handle parental right cases?224  San 
Antonio area District Judge Peter Sakai ties local parental right cases and 
their results to their association with “poverty, drugs, and a lack of mental 
health services.”225  Further, Judge Sakai also offers what he believes is 
a key to resolving this crisis: “empowering families is the key to 
reunifying them.”226 
It appears the Texas system is failing parents by infringing on their 
constitutional rights.227  The system lacks protection for those parents 
 
218. Cf. id. (“As of fiscal 2015, the Lone Star State has hauled in $84 million in incentives, 
15 percent of the $556 million in total funding given out.”). 
219. Id. (outlining where and how the adoption incentives are allocated in Texas). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. TEX. DEP’T OF FAM. & PROTECTIVE SERVS., THE STATE OF TEXAS 2018 ANNUAL 
PROGRESS AND SERVICES REPORT 734 (2018), [https://perma.cc/A5MK-X35J] (on file with  
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Race and Social Justice). 
223. E.g., Renick, supra note 197 (“Prior to 2014, most states failed to consistently draw an 
award from the program.  In 2006, 32 states failed to earn any adoption incentive.”). 
224. See, e.g., Crary, supra note 186 (describing how there are “state-to-state disparities in 
the rate of terminations and the extent of support services to avoid foster care placements.”).  
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. See Renick, supra note 197 (“The blanket practice of filing petitions to 
terminate . . . places parental rights at legal risk with little or no evidence to substantiate 
termination.”). 
30
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 23 [2021], No. 1, Art. 4
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol23/iss1/4
  
2021] THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS 137 
whose parental rights were underserving of termination.228  Texas’s 
response to the enactment of ALGIP has been critically acclaimed to treat 
adoptions as “much more than a cure-all than they really are.”229  With 
more adoptions occurring annually, and a consistent flow of incentives 
coming into the state, there is good reason to believe adoptions have 
catapulted the rate of terminations in Texas.230  This effect causes 
concerns amongst advocates who believe some of the kids affected by the 
termination movement “could have been safely returned to their 
parents.”231 
While Texas does finalize adoptions at an exceedingly high rate, the 
state often fails to succeed at finding permanency “for all of the children 
whose parents’ rights” have been terminated.232  For the time being, 
advocates can only hope the newly enacted “Family First Prevention 
Services Act” (FFPSA) will adequately provide effective services for 
parents.233  With the congressional intent to restructure federal child 
welfare funding, the FFPSA seeks to reduce children’s entry into foster 
care and promote services to parents by increasing access to substance 
abuse and mental health services.234  Only time will tell whether the 
FFPSA alleviates the burden associated to parents in the context of 
parental terminations.235   
  
 
228. See id. (“The practice in most parts of Texas is to file a termination for parental rights 
petition at the beginning of most cases even if there is no real indication that termination is 
needed.”). 
229. Crary, supra note 186.  
230.  See Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146 (“The programs that the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act govern thwart its very purpose as children continue to languish in foster care waiting 
for permanent adoptive homes, often until they age out of the system into negative life outcomes.”). 
231. Renick, supra note 197.  
232. See id. (describing Texas’s failures at finding permanency for children going through 
termination proceedings). 
233. See Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146 (confirming the FFPSA aims to include “more 
federal funds for services aimed at preventing the use of foster care” by addressing and improving 
“service gaps” to help parent’s needs). 
234. Title VII—Family First Prevention Services Act, Pub. L. No. 115–123, 132 Stat. 232, 
232–45 (“[P]rovid[ing] enhanced support to children and families and prevent[ing] foster care 
placements through the provision of mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment 
services, in-home parent skill-based programs, and kinship navigator services.”). 
235. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146. 
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IV.    THE IMPERMISSIBLE BASIS: HOW BEXAR COUNTY COURTS 
IMPROPERLY TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS 
While passage of the ALGIP resulted in numerous controversies 
throughout the nation, its effects in the Texas judicial system are 
particularly evident.236  Its implicit effects are seen in the manner Bexar 
County judicial officials treat parental right proceedings.237  While some 
parental right are fairly terminated, not all terminations are severed 
equally.238  Some involve egregious acts justifying the termination of a 
highly regarded, constitutionally protected principle.239 
Others involve minimal amounts of evidence presented by the 
Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) to substantiate 
their claim arguing termination would be in the best interest of the 
child.240  However, such claims are not always representative of the clear 
 
236. See Renick, supra note 197 (illustrating the perverse effects of the ALGIP in Texas). 
237. See In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 864, 870–72 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) 
(holding the evidence was insufficient to terminate a parent’s rights because the trial court relied 
upon evidence it could not take judicial notice over); see also In re G.M., No.04-19-0080-CV, WL 
3432088, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019) (Martinez, J. dissenting) (reproving the 
trial court’s improper use of evidence); see also In re T.N.J.J., No.04-19-00228-CV, WL 6333470 
at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 27, 2019) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (arguing the limited 
evidence presented was factually insufficient to support a decision to terminate the parent-child 
relationship).  
238. See, e.g., In re K.M.J., No. 04-18-00728-CV, WL 1459565, at *7 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio Apr. 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing an order terminating a father’s 
parental rights because a caseworker’s vague testimony coupled with a lack of “hard evidence” was 
insufficient to support a termination); see also, e.g., In re M.A.S.L., No. 04-18-00496-CV, WL 
6624405, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining the 
caseworker’s testimony concerned conclusory opinions that failed to establish the support needed 
to provide a finding of a statutory ground of termination); see also, e.g., In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 
at 870–71 (showing the trial court’s reliance on improperly judicially noticed evidence resulted in 
a reversal because there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding); see also, e.g., In re 
E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 148–50 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019) (Chapa, J., dissenting) (citing the 
role of innate biases in the context of parental terminations). 
239. See, e.g., In the Interest of T.N.S., 230 S.W.3d 434, 439 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
2007, no pet.) (affirming the termination of a mother’s parental rights for endangering her child 
after using cocaine while pregnant and causing the child to be born positive for cocaine). 
240. See In re A.J.L., No. 04-14-00013-CV, WL 4723129, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Sept. 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding the Department failed to meet its burden justifying the 
termination of a mother’s parental rights because the record was replete with evidence of the 
mother’s compliance with the family service plan and revealed there was no evidence showing the 
children were in danger or had an improper relationship with the mother); see also In re R.S.D., 
446 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (holding evidence of a mother’s 
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and convincing standard and proof required by the state’s legislative 
history.241  Such claims only reflect the miscarriages of justice occurring 
in the Bexar County family law system.242  These miscarriages 
perpetuate irrevocable damage that is felt most by the parents and 
children involved in the proceedings.243   
While the state receives federal funding for slating children through 
terminations to effectuate adoptions, their efforts have left many children 
as orphans.244  Sadly, these orphans will never get to see the end result 
the state envisioned when terminating their parent-child relationship.245  
In reality, over ninety percent of terminations in the state do not occur 
due to abuse or neglect but rather because a parent failed to adhere to the 
completion of court-ordered services.246  While the services are intended 
to benefit parents, they run the risk of providing a bigger hurdle of 
burdens for the parent to jump through.247  These services, while 
portrayed as a lifeline, are critically acclaimed as a noose to parental 
rights.248   
Rightfully so, these services were meant to benefit the parents and 
children.249  However, these mandated services typically leave parents 
 
limited criminal history along with the conclusory testimony was insufficient to support the trial 
court’s termination of her parental rights). 
241. See In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d at 822 (“[C]onclud[ing] the State did not meet its burden 
to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of appellant’s parental rights is in 
the child’s best interest.”); see also In re K.M.J., WL 1459565, at *7 (“[W]e cannot say that the 
‘degree of proof’ rose to the level of ‘clear and convincing’ as required to support the best interest 
findings.”). 
242. See, e.g., In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d at 150 (“[Parental termination cases] are not easy for 
parents, children, the Department, attorneys, or the courts because these cases involve fundamental 
rights of parents and important public concerns for child welfare.  Although our primary concern 
is the children’s welfare, parental termination cases are not made easier when innate bias negatively 
influences how some parents are treated in court.”). 
243. See id. (reiterating the difficulties experienced by parties in a parental termination case 
and how the trial court’s determination compelled the children to face the prospect of possibly 
spending the next decade in foster care without the possibility of adoption). 
244. Phagan-Hansel, supra note 146. 
245. See Renick, supra note 197 (“For every 1,000 children subject to a TPR, 386 are not 
adopted.”). 
246. Id. (“What should be a lifeline is actually a noose that terminates parents’ rights.”). 
247. Id. (providing that most terminations arise from a parent’s failure to complete court-
ordered services). 
248. Id. 
249. See STATE BAR OF TEX., A HANDBOOK FOR PARENTS AND GUARDIANS IN CHILD 
PROTECTION CASES, https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Consider_a_State_ 
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in a shortfall, especially those who try but are unable to complete the 
court-ordered services and unfortunately face an inevitable fate of losing 
their parental rights.250  A fate whose likelihood in Bexar County seems 
to be demised primarily through the evidentiary process and its: (1) 
improper use of judicial notice and (2) admittance of an unacceptable 
amount of evidence portrayed by the Department to meet the onerous 
burden of proof.251  While a logical inference may exist indicating 
parents who fail to complete these services are simply unwilling to adapt 
their lifestyles to reunify themselves with their children, it is also true 
compliance or the physical completion of some classes shows parents are 
willing to take the necessary steps toward reunification.252  Thus, while 
the failure to complete a service plan may support grounds for 
termination under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O), courts must 
still be mindful such a finding is not an automatically reason it is the 
child’s best interest to terminate their parental rights.253  Rather, 
sufficient evidence must still be shown under the heightened burden of 
proof required by the Texas Family Code.254  It is important we do not 
confuse an inference of unwillingness where progression exists.255   
 
Bar_Committee&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=28735 [https://perma.cc/U3 
H8-ACJ7] (“[A] purpose of [a permanency planning team meeting] is to come up with a service 
plan for [the] child and . . . family that will help get the family together again . . . .”). 
250. See In re T.N.J.J., No.04-19-00228-CV, WL 6333470 at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Nov. 27, 2019 no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming the termination of a father’s parental rights because 
the trial court could reasonably conclude the father “failed to participate in drug treatment and 
individualized counseling” as required by the family service plan). 
251. See In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 864, 870–871 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) 
(describing how the trial court adduced no evidence to support a determination to terminate the 
parent’s rights because the trial court improperly took judicial notice over facts it could not take 
judicial notice on); see also In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no 
pet.) (holding the conclusory testimony along with the scant evidence produced was insufficient to 
support the trial court’s termination of her parental rights). 
252. See In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 157 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019) (Chapa, J., 
dissenting) (reasoning an appellant who successfully took advantage of programs she did need in 
contrast to programs she did not need is a factor weighing against termination and not against a 
child’s best interest). 
253. See id. (describing how a basis of removal may be statutorily found without a finding 
supporting termination is in the child’s best interest). 
254. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). 
255. See, e.g., In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d at 157 (“[The Parent] did not complete her parenting, 
domestic violence, and anger management courses, and the majority weighs this against [her].  
While this evidence might support a finding of a ground for termination under subsection (O) for 
failing to comply with court-ordered provisions of a service plan, there is no evidence showing 
34
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While the state has millions to lose by not meeting an ever-changing 
annual quota of adoptions, it is equally important to acknowledge the 
consequences of meeting the baseline quota.256  Such actions promote 
funding at the expense of parents who are robbed of the chance of making 
a lifetime of memories with their children.257  Admittedly, not all parents 
are deserving of such memories, but it is the job of the judiciary to make 
this determination rightfully, impartially, and free of bias.258 
A. ALGIP Implications and the Problematic Evidentiary Process of 
Some Bexar County Courtrooms 
To fully consider the implications carried by ALGIP on Texas, it is 
important to realize in most parts of Texas, including Bexar County, the 
process of filing a petition to terminate a parent’s rights begins at the 
outset of a case even when “no real indication” exists to show termination 
is needed.259  Unfortunately, this places a perverse effect on parents 
whose rights are put at risk immediately following the removal of their 
children.260  An effect promoting adoptions as the forefront option while 
curtailing other equally plausible options.261  Options which promote the 
likelihood of preventing the severance of the parent-child relationship in 
cases where it can be maintained.262   
Texas has fallen under immense scrutiny for the high percentage of 
parental terminations occurring and developing as a result of significant 
 
appellant lacked parenting skills, engaged in domestic violence in any of her relationships, or had 
anger management issues.  I respectfully disagree with the majority’s suggestion that it is against 
the children’s best interest if a parent has yet to complete courses, which the parent has shown no 
signs of needing. . . . [U]ndisputed evidence establishes [the parent] successfully took advantage of 
programs she did need. . . . Because undisputed evidence shows progression and appellant 
successfully took advantage of programs available to assist her where she actually needed 
improvement, this factor weighs moderately against termination.”). 
256. See Renick, supra note 197 (“[W]hile Texas finalizes adoptions at a high rate, it is 
hardly successful at finding permanency for all of the children whose parents’ rights are 
terminated. . . . A large portion of those children languish in foster care through their teenage 
years . . . .”). 
257. Id. (“We do a disservice to kids by putting adoption on a pedestal when there are other 
options . . . where important relationships can be maintained.”). 
258. See, e.g., Crary, supra note 186 (discussing how bias against the biological parents 
ensues once a parental termination proceeding begins). 
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problems in the state’s child-welfare system.263  Such problems include 
turnover amongst the senior leadership, a class action suit alleging 
pervasive flaws in a conservatorship program, controversial deaths of 
foster children in the system, and, most importantly, a lack of services 
helping parents meet and address their needs.264  While the Department 
attributes a lack of engagement by parents as reasons for the lack of 
services available, critics have expressed their concerns and allege the 
system’s failure to give parents a fair chance to address their problems 
throughout the so-called reunification process.265 
The funding received by the ALGIP is another consideration adding to 
the backdrop of problems associated within the Texas child-welfare 
system.266  While the funding received is amongst the top 100 funding 
sources in Texas, the annual incentives should not justify why Texas 
perceives adoptions as the best outcome for children or as a reason to 
instill bias against biological parents.267  With an estimated total of six 
million dollars in funding throughout the 2018 fiscal year, the ALGIP’s 
impact has gone beyond funding and has implicitly affected the state’s 
judicial recognition of parental rights.268   
Although the ALGIP is one of the top 100 sources of funding in Texas, 
it sits at the bottom of the list at 97.269  Unlike other states, this revenue 
has been a predictable stream of annual funding for Texas.270  Texas, for 
the last two decades, has borne the fruits of ALGIP by pushing for 
 
263. Crary, supra note 186.  
264. Id. 
265. Id. (analyzing whether parents lack of engagement or the state system’s shortcoming 
are correlated to problems with reunification). 
266. See Renick, supra note 197 (noting Texas’ push for adoptions is causally correlated to 
the consistent stream of incentives earned annually through the ALGIP). 
267. LEGIS. BUDGET BD., TOP 100 FEDERAL FUNDING SOURCES IN THE TEXAS STATE 
BUDGET 10 (Apr. 2019), https://www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/Publications/Primer/5075_Top_ 
100_Federal_Funding_Sources_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9JN-835Y]. 
268. Id. at 54; see Renick, supra note 197 (demonstrating continual funding has led Texas’s 
thrust for adoptions by severing parental rights). 
269. See LEGIS. BUDGET BD., supra note 267, at 15 (illustrating Adoption and Legal 
Guardianship Incentive Payment is ranked nearly last in the top one-hundred funding sources in 
Texas). 
270. ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES, ADOPTION AND LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP INCENTIVE 
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adoptions and simultaneously being rewarded for doing so.271  With the 
ideal of attaining federal funding, Texas has consistently moved 
disturbingly quickly towards terminating parents’ rights.272   
An ideal putting the desire for incentives ahead of protecting the 
constitutional rights of parents.273  With a lack of empowerment towards 
families and the state’s short fuse with parents, some district courts in 
Bexar County have failed to accord the means of reaching an impartial 
jurisprudential result.274  Some of the various ways this occurs stems 
from the inequitable ways evidence is presented and admitted in Bexar 
County family courtrooms.275   
1. Judicial Notice and the Insufficiency of Evidence 
One of the primary mechanisms depriving parents of an equitable 
parental termination proceeding involves the sufficiency of the evidence 
presented by the Department.276  Throughout numerous parental 
termination cases, presiding District Judges in Bexar County have taken 
judicial notice of facts they could not take judicial notice over and have 
considered evidence held by the appellate courts to be factually 
insufficient to support a holding terminating a parent’s rights.277  A court 
may take judicial notice regarding facts not subject to reasonable dispute, 
 
 
271. Renick, supra note 197. 
272. Id.  
273. See, e.g., id. (implying the incentive of federal funds clouds parental rights since the 
“blanket practice” of filing petition to terminate is contrary to the DFPS policy). 
274. Crary, supra note 186.  
275. See, e.g., In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 864, 870–71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no 
pet. h.) (explaining the trial court’s reliance on the evidence was insufficient to support the 
termination of the parent’s rights because the court had improperly taken judicial notice and, as a 
result, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding). 
276. See, e.g., In re R.M.P., No. 04-17-00666-CV, WL 2976451, at *5 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio June 13, 2018) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (“The law sets a high evidentiary bar for 
termination of parental rights.  We do not alleviate the plight of Texas foster children by lowering 
that bar and perpetuating diminished judicial expectations of the proof that must be presented by 
the Department.”). 
277. See In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d at 871 (reversing a trial court order to terminate a parent’s 
rights because: (1) evidence was improperly judicially noticed; and (2) the remaining evidence 
could not support the trial court’s finding); see also In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (revealing the scant record did not justify the trial court’s termination 
of the mother’s parental rights). 
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including previous orders and findings of fact from the same case.278   
However, a trial court must not take judicial notice regarding the truth 
of the allegations in the records, such as allegations or affidavits made in 
a family service plan or concerning an expert’s testimony.279  As a result, 
even a sworn affidavit cannot be subject to judicial notice.280  Further, if 
the affidavit is not introduced as an exhibit during a trial, the trial court’s 
use of the affidavit could subject their determination to reversal due to a 
lack of sufficient evidence.281  To do otherwise would violate the 
integrity of the court’s truth-seeking function and would deny parents of 
their due process rights.282  Thus, it is of the utmost importance judges 
deny opportunities to rely on facts that were not previously admitted into 
evidence.283   
In Bexar County, justices in the Texas Fourth Court of Appeals are 
cracking down on the trial court’s problematic reliance on facts not 
included in the evidence of parental terminations cases.284  For example, 
 
278. In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d at 870; see In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005)  
(“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.”). 
279. In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d at 870 (“A court may not, however, take judicial notice of the 
truth of allegations in its records. . . . [Thus, a] trial court [cannot] take judicial notice of the 
allegations [a] caseworker ma[kes] in the family service plan.”); see, e.g., In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 
85 (“If a fact is generally known, then obviously no expert is needed. Moreover, expert testimony 
invariably concerns matters in dispute which are not capable of accurate resolution from outside, 
unquestioned sources.”). 
280. See, e.g., In re Allen, 359 S.W.3d 284, 289 n.5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) 
(illustrating how a sworn affidavit was not admitted as evidence in trial because it was not 
introduced as an exhibit nor did the trial court take judicial notice of its content). 
281. See id. (“Our review of the record indicates that the sworn affidavit accompanying the 
petition was neither introduced as an exhibit at trial, nor was there any indication that the trial court 
took judicial notice of its content.  No judicial notice could have been taken of its content because 
the content was not a subject matter for judicial notice.  Accordingly, it was not evidence at the 
trial.”). 
282. In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 149 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) (explaining 
how by improperly taking judicial notice of the truth of allegations, “the trial court denied appellant 
her clearly established due process rights and impaired the integrity of the court’s truth-seeking 
function.”). 
283. See id. (“[T]o protect parents’ due process rights . . . the trial court should make 
extraordinary efforts to consider only the evidence admitted at trial.”). 
284. See id. (“Looming deadlines and overcrowded dockets cannot justify shortcuts that 
undermine the truth-seeking function of our courts.”); see also In re K.M.J., No. 04-18-00728-CV, 
WL 1459565, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[W]e cannot 
say that the ‘degree of proof’ rose to the level of ‘clear and convincing’ as required to support the 
38
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In re G.M., two sitting justices took exception over the trial court’s use 
of evidence to support an order terminating a parent’s rights.285  
Although the majority affirmed the trial court’s ruling, Justice Martinez 
and Justice Watkins in their respective dissenting and concurring 
opinions scolded the trial court’s use of: (1) a videotape in the reporter’s 
record that was not admitted into evidence; (2) inadmissible hearsay 
statements from the father’s girlfriend; and (3) the lack of a developed 
record.286   
The videotape and hearsay statements were criticized by Justice 
Martinez as indiscernible upon review because it was not under the record 
and, as a result, could not be considered upon review to support the trial 
court’s decision to terminate the parent’s rights.287  Thus, it is paramount 
the trial court explicitly admit evidence instead of implicitly relying on it 
being admitted simply because the proponent offers it into evidence.288  
 
best interest findings.”); see also In re M.A.S.L., No. 04-18-00496-CV, WL 6624405, at *1–6 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio Dec. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing termination order supported by 
legally and factually insufficient evidence that showed the caseworker: had no contact with father, 
did not meet with father to discuss family service plan, and had “no idea” whether he completed 
services); see also In re D.B.T., No. 04-14-00919-CV, WL 1939072, at *4 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[The] State presented no evidence about [the 
father]’s parenting skills that would make his failure to complete a parenting course probative of 
[child]’s best interest.”); see also In re J.A.J., No. 04-14-00684-CV, WL 7444340, at *3 (Tex. 
App.—San Antonio Dec. 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[The Court] may exercise [their] broad 
discretion to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice when there is a probability that a case 
has not been fully developed for any reason.”); see also In re U.B., No. 04-12-00687-CV, WL 
441890, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding the evidence 
legally insufficient to support the termination order); see also In re A.Q.W., 395 S.W.3d 285,  
290–91 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (holding the evidence legally insufficient because 
the record did not support the State’s argument that father had been jailed repeatedly or been in and 
out of drug treatment).  See generally In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 475 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
2014) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (“We are duty bound to carefully scrutinize termination 
proceedings and must strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent.”). 
285. See In re G.M., No.04-19-0080-CV, WL 3432088, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
July 31, 2019) (Watkins, J., concurring) (expressing concerns over the requirement to review orders 
that permanently sever constitutionally protected parental rights when the appellate record is “so 
underdeveloped”); see also In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *5–6 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
the court for its reliance on material not in the record and its improper use of hearsay testimony to 
terminate a parent’s rights). 
286. In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *4–5 (Watkins, J. concurring) (denouncing the appellate 
court’s review of a video tape improperly admitted into evidence and the trial court’s 
underdeveloped record); id. at *5–6 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
287. Id. at *5 (Martinez, J., dissenting). 
288. See id. at *5 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (“[M]aterial that is not on the record . . .  cannot 
be considered on review or support the trial court’s termination order.”); see also In re E.F., 591 
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Further, Justice Watkins expressed similar sentiments citing a scant 
record and concerns over the trial court’s dedication to protect parent’s 
fundamental constitutional rights.289  In the opinion, Justice Watkins 
expressed dissatisfaction with the trial court’s record since it involved the 
irrevocable divestment of parental rights using a record that was not fully 
developed under the Texas Family Code.290  After all, a record 
comprised of fewer than forty pages of evidence, including facts not 
admitted into evidence, can hardly establish a record comprised of the 
due diligence required to establish by clear and convincing evidence the 
termination of parental rights.291 
By acknowledging the finality surrounding parental terminations, the 
Fourth Court of Appeals implores the trial court of their role in creating 
a fully developed reporter record with admitted evidence.292  A record, 
if left undeveloped, deprives appellate courts of meaningful review and 
increases the possibility of reversal for terminating a parent’s rights with 
factually insufficient evidence.293  After all, due process requires the 
Department to meet a standard of proof no less than clear and 
convincing.294  Thus, due process requires an exacting standard on the 
Department to prove with admitted evidence an explicitly developed 
record supporting the termination of a parent’s rights.295 
 
S.W.3d 138, 142 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) (“[The only evidence that can support 
the trial court’s [parental termination] order is that evidence admitted at trial.”). 
289. In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *3–5 (Watkins, J., concurring). 
290. Id. at *4–5 (Watkins, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of a fully developed 
record to protect fundamental constitutional parental rights); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 161.001(b) (referencing the statutory means for terminating a parent-child relationship). 
291. In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *4 (Watkins, J., concurring); see In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 
138, 142 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) (urging the trial court to more completely 
develop the reporter’s record given the magnitude of the constitutional rights involved). 
292. In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *3 (Watkins, J., Concurring) (“I also write to add my voice 
to the chorus of opinions from this court imploring trial courts and parties to dedicate the time, 
attention, and resources required to protect the fundamental constitutional relationship between 
parents and their children.”). 
293. In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *3 (Watkins, J., Concurring) (recognizing the fundamental 
liberty interests at stake with an underdeveloped appellate record). 
294. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). 
295. Cf. In re A.J.L., No. 04-14-00013-CV, WL 4723129 at *2–5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Sept. 24, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“There was no evidence at trial regarding any emotional or 
physical danger to the children, or that the parent-child relationship was improper.  Accordingly, it 
appears that the Department abandoned its reunification goal because Mother was incarcerated, and 
that the Department recommended termination solely because the deadline for the court to either 
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Similarly, in re E.F., Justice Chapa expressed her concerns with the 
number of parental terminations in their jurisdiction and the innate biases 
against parents.296  In the case, the trial court ignored undisputable 
evidence surrounding a parent’s management of their mental health 
condition and instead relied on the diagnosis as the reason to terminate 
the parent-child relationship.297  While the judiciary is to refrain from 
advocating for one side in legal proceedings, judges are human and 
remain susceptible to implicit biases.298  These biases, taken together 
with a trial court’s reliance on facts not in evidence, negatively influence 
how parents are treated in the trial level.299  Such negative influences 
cloud a trial court’s capacity to effectively differentiate sufficient 
evidence from the insufficiencies relied upon while terminating a parent-
child relationship.300 
As a result, a parent’s compliance with some services in the family 
service plan or their proactive management in treating a mental  
health condition is often overlooked with demeaning results.301  With  
a burden of proof consisting of clear and convincing evidence, the  
drastic remedy of terminating a parent’s rights must be strictly  
 
render a final order of termination or to dismiss the suit was approaching.  We thus reverse . . .  the 
trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights . . . .”). 
296. In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 148–50 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019) (Chapa, J., 
dissenting). 
297. Id. at 145–49. 
298. See id. at 149 (Chapa, J., dissenting) (“[I]nnate biases might have played a role in the 
termination of the appellant’s parental rights.”); see also Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the 
Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL 
MAL. & ETHICS 278, 308 (2014) (“While judges strive to apply the law fairly and impartially, they 
are human and therefore must view things through their own cognitive lenses—judges, like all 
humans, are not free from biases. . . .”). 
299. See, e.g., In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d at 148 (“The trial court’s remarks suggest that merely 
having bipolar disorder and a shaved head makes a parent less able, makes children ‘needier,’ or 
both, and so much so that depriving a parent and her children of a relationship is warranted.”). 
300. Id. at 149–50. 
301. See id. at 143 (“[T]he trial court ignored undisputed evidence establishing appellant 
manages her condition proactively and effectively and it expressly relied on appellant’s mental 
health diagnosis as a reason for terminating her parental rights.”); see also In the Interest of T.N.J.J. 
No.04-19-00228-CV, WL 6333470 at *51 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 27, 2019) (Martinez, J., 
dissenting) (“I cannot agree to affirm termination under a factual sufficiency review based on the 
limited evidence of Father’s drug use and incomplete drug treatment where there is also evidence 
of partial completion and explanations for incompletion.”). 
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scrutinized.302  Any evidence requiring the “piling of inferences” upon 
inferences cannot constitute the clear and convincing evidence needed to 
support termination.303  It is crucial trial courts do not seek to justify 
looming deadlines or overcrowded dockets as a shortcut to undermine a 
parent’s fundamental due process rights.304  The prospect of compelling 
a child to foster care with the possibility of never being adopted—when 
a relationship between the parent and child can still be maintained—gives 
rise to a result-oriented jurisprudence favoring adoptions.305  These 
results only diminish parents’ rights while simultaneously disintegrating 
the chances a parent has at keeping their family together.306   
However, the problems occurring in Bexar County courtrooms are not 
unfixable.307  Bexar County trial courts have shown they are capable of 
properly considering evidence at trials terminating a parent-child 
relationship.308  For example, in re S.A.C., the Fourth Court of Appeals 
held the trial court properly took judicial notice over previous orders and 
findings of fact concerning the same case.309  As a result, the Fourth 
Court had no problem affirming the trial court’s holding because the 
judicially noticed evidence sufficiently supported a finding terminating 
the parent’s rights.310  Changes as simple as dedicating more time in 
court developing the record, putting forth admissible testimonial 
evidence, and properly taking judicial notice can help diminish the 
 
302. Cf. In re K.M.J., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014) (“The natural rights between a 
parent and their child are of constitutional dimensions and termination of parental rights is 
‘complete, final and irrevocable.’”). 
303. In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d at 151 (illustrating the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence cannot be based on conclusory presumptions). 
304. Id. at 150. 
305. David Crary, Terminating Parental Rights: State Policies Vary Widely, AP NEWS 
(Apr. 30, 2016), https://apnews.com/c9fec9ee24d64f4b9e56d1425179a50e [https://perma.cc/SN 
3U-BFUU]; see In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d at 158 (emphasizing how the majority affirmed a parental 
termination order when “the undisputed evidence establishes the children are being deprived” of a 
relationship with their mother when it can still be maintained). 
306. Cf. Crary, supra note 305 (acknowledging how once children are taken into foster care, 
the likelihood that a parent will be reunited with their child decreases due to the lack of available 
legal services). 
307. See, e.g., In re S.A.C., No. 04-13-00058-CV, WL 2247471 at *3 (Tex. App.— 
San Antonio May 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the trial court properly took judicial notice). 
308. See, e.g., id. at *3 (affirming the trial court’s proper utilization of judicial notice in the 
termination proceeding). 
309. Id. 
310. Id.  
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impractical ways Bexar County has disparaged parental rights.311  As a 
legal community, we must do better.  We must ensure Bexar County 
courtrooms adequately protect the fundamental constitutional rights 
afforded to parents.312  To do otherwise only shows an inadequate 
commitment to jurisprudential duties.313   
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court left practitioners, families, and states devoid of 
uniformity within the family law sphere after its decision in Troxell.314  
After the Supreme Court cast its nebulous decision, some states have 
vigorously attempted to protect parental rights under the strictest scrutiny 
available, while others have attenuated such efforts in a minuscule 
way.315  Texas has not been a stout defender of parental rights.316  
 
311. See In re G.M., No.04-19-0080-CV, WL 3432088, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
July 31, 2019) (Martinez, J., dissenting) (explaining the need for the trial court to not imperishably 
rely on facts not admitted into evidence when ordering the termination of parental rights); see also 
In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 142 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.) (“[W]e urge the trial court 
and the parties to more completely develop the evidence at trial, so the appellate record is 
commensurate with the finality of parental termination.”); see also In re S.A.C., WL 2247471, at 
*3 (noting how the trial court properly took judicial notice and provided sufficient evidence to 
terminate the parent-child relationship). 
312. But cf. Crary, supra note 305 (“According to federal data, some states terminate 
parental rights at a rate 25 times higher than states at the low end of the scale.”). 
313. Cf. In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *7 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (illustrates how parental 
rights were terminated with paltry evidence not meeting the clear and convincing evidence 
standard). 
314. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).  See generally The 
Supreme Court’s Parental Rights Doctrine, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG, https://parentalrights.org/ 
understand_the_issue/supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/G4JU-Y2H3] (recognizing the impact of 
the Troxel decision on judges and states, regarding ruling on parental rights). 
315.  See Protecting Parental Rights at the State Level, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG,  
https://parentalrights.org/states/ [https://perma.cc/YB2H-8VNF] (showing the variation of state 
laws in the parental rights context).  Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-507 (West 2020) 
(broadening the requirements for terminating parental rights by requiring courts to terminate 
parental right if it is “strictly necessary”), and Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 446 P.3d 380, 
388 (Ariz. 2019) (Bolick, J., dissenting) (citing the legislative intent of the state to enforce strict 
scrutiny), with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (showing the two-prong analysis courts must 
follow to terminate the parent-child relationship).  
316. See Christie Renick, Bigger in Texas: Number of Adoptions, and Parents Who Lose 
Their Rights, IMPRINT (May 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://imprintnews.org/featured/bigger-in-texas-
adoptions-and-parents-who-lose-their-rights/30990 [https://perma.cc/SF2J-V5QB] (explaining 
Texas’ “penchant” to terminate parental rights). 
43
Narvaez: The Termination of Parental Rights in Texas
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2021
  
150 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 23:107 
Instead, Texas has become known as the “king of adoptions.”317  A title 
earned by expeditiously terminating parental rights, even in times when 
familial ties could be maintained.318  A title capable of irrevocably 
destroying families.319  What encompasses the improper termination of 
parental rights in Texas includes terminations encapsulated by 
insufficient evidence, the wrongful application of judicial notice, and a 
lack of empowerment towards maintaining familial bonds.320   
Change within Texas, especially within Bexar County family 
courtrooms, is needed to ensure parental rights are treated with the dignity 
they deserve.321  Change is not implausible.322  However, until the 
Supreme Court clarifies the Troxel decision, states will remain divided 
on their approaches to parental rights cases.323  Until clarification is 
made, states such as Texas must attempt to remedy and address improper 
approaches some counties have taken to terminate parental rights.324  
Although change cannot help families whose relationships are already 
irrevocably destroyed, change can help empower the future and the 
families who could deal with the possibility of improperly losing their 
 
317. Id. 
318. See generally id. (reiterating adoptions in Texas are a symptom of the state’s failure to 
reunify families). 
319. In re R.H., No. 04-98-00051-CV, 1998 WL 904355, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Dec. 30, 1998, no pet.). 
320. Crary, supra note 305 (explaining the lack of reunification between families in the 
Bexar County is tied to a lack of empowerment); see, e.g., In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d 864, 870–71 
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (concluding the trial court’s reliance on an affidavit’s 
allegations when terminating a parent’s rights was the result of improperly taking judicial notice 
and, as a result, left no evidence to support the trial court’s finding); see also, e.g., In re R.S.D., 
446 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (holding the scant record was 
insufficient to support the trial court’s parental termination order). 
321. See, e.g., Crary, supra note 305 (exploring the different initiatives and efforts of San 
Antonio District Judge who is using initiatives aimed at “avoiding unnecessary foster-care 
placements and [parental] terminations.”). 
322. See id. (Citing the Department’s efforts to offer and produce “several initiatives aimed 
at promoting reunification.”). 
323.  See Sandra Martinez, The Misinterpretation of Troxel v. Granville: Construing the 
New Standard for Third-Party Visitation, 36 FAM. L.Q. 487, 495 (2002) (“[C]ourt’s interpreting 
the [Troxel] case have been without guidance and thus have applied varying standards.”). 
324. See, e.g., In re J.E.H., 384 S.W.3d at 870–72 (reversing the trial court’s termination 
order for impermissibly considering evidence that was improperly judicially noticed). 
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familial ties.325  This change cannot save all families, but it can ensure 
parents maintain their rights in cases where it is possible to be 
maintained.326  Bexar County courts can properly administer such 
change by providing: (1) an adequate amount of evidence to meet the 
threshold burden of proof; (2) emphasizing taking judicial notice 
properly; and (3) empowering reunion instead of empowering 
adoptions.327  These changes, taken cumulatively, can allow Bexar 
County courts to terminate parental rights properly.328  Although change 
is always easier said than done, what matters most is we afford parents 
the justice they constitutionally deserve.   
 
 
325. See In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 150 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019) (Chapa, J., 
dissenting) (implying if courts preserve their “truth-seeking function,” the probability of 
wrongfully severing parental rights will be diminished). 
326. See, e.g., id. at 149 (explaining how “the undisputed evidence” was not properly 
considered by the trial court and resulted in depriving a child of a relationship with their mother 
when it can still be maintained); see also Renick, supra note 316 (describing how Texas perversely 
terminates relationships that are capable of being maintained). 
327. See In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d at 142 (emphasizing how the trial court must strive to make 
a more completely developed record for the purpose of providing an appellate court with a record 
commensurate with the finality of a parental termination.); see also In re G.M., No.04-19-0080-
CV, WL 3432088, at 5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 31, 2019) (Martinez, J., dissenting) 
(emphasizing the need for the trial court to not imperishably rely on facts not admitted into evidence 
when ordering the termination of parental rights); see also, e.g., In re S.A.C., No. 04-13-00058-
CV, WL 2247471 at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (describing 
how the trial court’s proper utilization of judicial notice provided sufficient evidence to terminate 
the parent-child relationship).  
328. See In re G.M., WL 3432088, at *5 (Watkins, J., concurring) (expressing the 
importance of properly administering proceedings and the collection of sufficient evidence at the 
trial court level, especially when parental rights are at stake). 
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